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An outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) involving 27 patients and 14 health-care
workers (HCW) was studied. The outbreak started in the hematology unit of the University Hospital Rotter-
dam, Dijkzigt, The Netherlands, and spread to the surgical unit. Twenty-one patients (77.8%) developed
clinical disease, and five died. Subsequently, MRSA was detected in food and in the throat of one of the HCW
who prepared food for hematology patients. Food contaminated by an HCW most likely caused the first case
of MRSA septicemia. This route of transmission has not been described before. The outbreak strain was
probably transmitted to the surgical unit by a colonized nurse, where it caused an explosive outbreak. Airborne
MRSA transmission played an important role in disseminating the organism. The outbreak was controlled
within 6 months by intensifying surveillance, temporarily closing the affected wards, treating carriers, and
instituting an MRSA ward outside the hospital. Phage typing, insertion sequence probing, protein A gene
typing, and DNA fingerprinting by PCR revealed that all outbreak-related isolates were identical. By pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis, all but one of the outbreak-related isolates were determined to be identical. Protein
A gene typing identified numerous (11) repeat units in all outbreak-related isolates, which supports the
suggestion that the outbreak strain may have been more virulent and more transmissible than other MRSA
strains. Pheno- and genotyping studies underlined the value of DNA fingerprinting methods for investigation
of MRSA epidemiology. Optimal discriminatory power was achieved by combining the results of four geno-
typing methods.
In Europe, the incidence of methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA) in hospitals varies considerably from
country to country. Generally, the incidence of MRSA in-
creases from north to south. In a pan-European surveillance,
the incidence was found to be highest in Spain, France, and
Italy (30.3 to 34.4%) and lowest in Denmark, Sweden, and The
Netherlands (0.1 to 1.5%) (34). Despite the low incidence in
Dutch hospitals, outbreaks of MRSA occur regularly, espe-
cially in the larger teaching hospitals. Most outbreaks are due
to the import of strains by patients transferred from hospitals
in countries with increased MRSA incidence (33). Outbreaks
in low-prevalence settings offer unique opportunities to deter-
mine the value of various typing methods, since the clonal
relatedness among the MRSA isolates involved is obvious.
Scientists still debate whether one clone of MRSA has
spread throughout the world (1, 17, 21). However, numerous
investigations have demonstrated that the phenotype (19, 21,
30) and genotype (7, 13, 14, 17, 28) of MRSA vary. These
procedures are particularly useful for comparing bacterial iso-
lates involved in nosocomial outbreaks. Recently, it has been
shown that especially the genotypic assays possess excellent
discriminatory power and exhibit subtle resolution capabilities
(29).
This report describes the epidemiological aspects of an
MRSA outbreak which occurred in the University Hospital
Rotterdam, Dijkzigt, The Netherlands. The initial reservoir for
the outbreak strain was probably a dietary worker, who carried
MRSA in his throat and prepared food for patients on the
hematology unit. Transmission of MRSA by contaminated
food has not been described before.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Isolation and processing of MRSA strains. Between November 1992 and April
1993, an outbreak of MRSA occurred in the University Hospital Rotterdam.
MRSA strains were isolated from 27 patients (Table 1), 14 health-care workers
(HCW), and environmental samples. Surveillance cultures were routinely made
for patient specimens from the nares, throat, perirectal area, and, if present, skin
lesions (including wounds) and catheter insertion sites. For patients who had
urinary catheters, urine was also cultured. Surveillance cultures from HCW
consisted routinely of swabs from the nares and from skin lesions if present.
The initial cultures were inoculated on Columbia agar base supplemented with
5% sheep blood and mannitol salt agar. The plates were incubated at 378C for 48
h and inspected after 18 to 24 h and after 42 to 48 h. All isolates were identified
on the basis of colony morphology, positive catalase slide test, and positive
coagulase tube test. Additionally, biochemical analysis was performed with Vitek
(BioMerieux, Lyon, France). Methicillin resistance was determined by inocula-
tion of strains on Mueller-Hinton agar (Oxoid CM 337; Brunschwig, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands) with a disk containing 5 mg of methicillin (Oxoid; Brunschwig).
Plates were incubated at 308C for 24 h, and inhibition zones were measured (3).
Isolates with inhibition zones smaller than 17 mm in diameter were considered
methicillin resistant. All strains were grown as monocultures in brain heart
infusion broth and stored as lyophilized powder.
A sample of 17 outbreak-related isolates, including isolates from patients,
HCW, and the environment, were evaluated by several typing methods (outbreak
group; see Table 2). Thirteen epidemiologically unrelated strains were included
in the typing studies as comparison strains: five isolates were obtained in the
same hospital from patients transferred from foreign hospitals (control group 1),
and eight isolates with the same phagovar as the outbreak-related isolates were
obtained from the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and Environmental
Protection, Bilthoven, The Netherlands (control group 2).
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Antimicrobial susceptibility testing. In addition to susceptibility to methicillin,
the susceptibilities of the strains to ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, oxacillin, ri-
fampin, tetracycline, phosphomycin, tobramycin, co-trimoxazole, clindamycin,
vancomycin, and fusidic acid were determined. All assays were performed by the
method of Bauer et al. (3), using breakpoints according to National Committee
for Clinical Laboratory Standards guidelines (22). Resistance was classified as 0,
intermediate susceptibility was classified as 1, and full susceptibility was classified
as 2.
Phage typing. Phage typing was performed at the Dutch National Institute of
Public Health and Environmental Protection by application of the international
set of typing phages and a set of typical Dutch phages (18, 23). Different phage
patterns were given a type designation.
PCR-mediated DNA fingerprinting (arbitrary primed PCR [AP-PCR]). AP-
PCR was performed essentially as described previously (30). DNA was isolated
from overnight cultures by lysostaphin treatment, guanidine isothiocyanate lysis
(5), and subsequent DNA affinity chromatography. Approximately 5 ng of DNA
was included per PCR mixture. The PCR mixture consisted of 10 mM Tris-HCl
(pH 9.0), 50 mM KCl, 2.5 mM MgCl2, 0.01% gelatin, and 0.1% Triton X-100.
Deoxyribonucleotide triphosphates were present at 0.2 mM in the reaction mix-
ture, and 0.5 U of Taq DNA polymerase (Sphaero Q, Leiden, The Netherlands)
was included. Five different primers were included in the typing assays. The
designations and sequences of the primers were as follows: 186, 59-GGTT
GGGTGAGAATTGCACG-39; 188, 59-AAGAGCCCGT-39; 192, 59-GTGGAT
GCGA-39; ERIC1, 59-ATGTAAGCTCCTGGGGATTCAC-39; and ERIC2, 59-
AAGTAAGTGACTGGGGTGACGC-39. All primers were applied in separate
assays (50 pmol of primer per PCR mixture). The amplification was performed
in a model 60 thermocycler (Biomed, Thores, Germany) by a program consisting
of 40 repeated cycles of 1 min at 948C, 1 min at 258C, and 2 min at 748C. Prior
to cycling, the mixtures were denatured at 948C for 4 min, and postcycling, the
mixtures were incubated at 748C for an additional 10 min. PCR samples were
analyzed by agarose gel electrophoresis. The gels, containing 2% agarose in 40
mM Tris-borate (pH 7.8)–2 mM EDTA (0.53 TBE), were run in the presence of
ethidium bromide. After photography (Polaroid high-speed sheet film 57), DNA
fingerprints were compared by visual inspection.
The results for each primer were indexed by numbering, thereby defining the
number of different DNA fingerprints (i.e., amplicon banding patterns) that
could be distinguished by single assays. One- and two-band differences between
two DNA fingerprints derived from different strains were classified as subclonal
variation, indicated by adding a prime to the index character (see Table 2). The
overall PCR type was defined by a combination of the results obtained with the
five individual primers. If subclonal variations were detected with individual
primers, this was indicated by subnumbering of the PCR type.
PFGE. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was performed at the Univer-
sity of Iowa, Iowa City. Contour-clamped homogeneous electric field (CHEF)
analysis was performed with the CHEF DR-II (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Rich-
mond, Calif.). Bacteria were embedded in low-melting-temperature agarose
(FMC Corp., Philadelphia, Pa.) and treated with lysostaphin and proteinase
K-sodium dodecyl sulfate (SDS) according to established protocols (24, 28, 29).
DNA was digested in situ by SmaI (New England Biolabs, Beverly, Mass.)
according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Agarose gels (1%) were run in
0.53 TBE at 138C and at 6 V/cm. Switching times were ramped from 10 to 90 s
for a total run time of 24 h for optimal separation of DNA fragments between 50
and 500 kb in size. Strain differences were based on the detection of restriction
fragment length polymorphism (RFLP). One- and two-band differences were
designated subclonal variations, indicated by subnumbering; differences of three
or more bands were interpreted as indicating different strains. Comparisons and
calculation of the percent homology were performed manually. Dendrograms
were constructed by the unweighted pair group method using arithmetic averages
(UPGMA) subroutine of the PHYLIP software (9, 11).
Detection of protein A gene polymorphisms by PCR. Length polymorphisms in
the staphylococcal protein A gene were determined by PCR essentially as de-
scribed elsewhere (12). In short, the repetitive region within the protein A
gene was amplified by using oligonucleotide primers with the following DNA
sequences: 59-TGTAAAACGACGGCCAGTGCTAAAAAGCTAAACGATG
C-39 and 59-CAGGAAACAGCTATGACCCCACCAAATACAGTTGTTACC-39.
After PCR, DNA was cleaved with the restriction enzyme RsaI (Boehringer
GmbH, Mannheim, Germany) and RFLPs were determined by electrophoresis
in 2% agarose gels run in 0.53 TBE. The number of repetitive units present in
the genes’ variable region was estimated by comparisons with molecular weight
markers (100-bp marker; Pharmacia, Gouda, The Netherlands).
Insertion sequence probing. Insertion sequence probing was performed at the
Dutch National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection. For
RFLP analysis, extraction of chromosomal DNA and Southern blotting were
performed as described previously (15). Genomic DNA was extracted from 1.5
ml of overnight culture by using lysostaphin, SDS, and proteinase K. DNA was
purified further by extraction with phenol-chloroform and ethanol precipitation.
Finally, the DNA was dissolved in 100 ml of TE (10 mM Tris-HCl, 1 mM EDTA;
pH 8.0). ClaI (Boehringer) was used to digest DNA according to the manufac-
turer’s instructions (4). The digested DNA was analyzed by electrophoresis in a
1% agarose gel at 25 V overnight in TBE and stained in ethidium bromide (0.5
TABLE 1. Clinical, geographical, and bacteriological data for patients colonized or infected with MRSA
Patient
no. Ward
MRSA isolation
date (mo/day/yr)
Wk of
outbreak Clinical diagnosis or surgery
Presence of
infectiona
Site of
infection
Prosthetic
vascular graft Amputation Outcome
b
1 Hematology 11/12/92 1 Acute myeloid leukemia Y Blood N N Death
2 Vascular surgery 11/22/92 3 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y N Death
3 Vascular surgery 11/24/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y Y Survival
4 Vascular surgery 11/26/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound N N Survival
5 Vascular surgery 11/26/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound N Y Survival
6 Vascular surgery 11/26/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound N Y Survival
7 Vascular surgery 11/26/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y Y Survival
8 Vascular surgery 11/26/92 4 Aneurysm of aorta N Y N Survival
9 Vascular surgery 11/28/92 4 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y Y Survival
10 Vascular surgery 12/01/92 5 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y N Survival
11 Vascular surgery 12/03/92 5 Aneurysm of aorta N Y N Survival
12 Surgical ICU 12/03/92 5 Peritonitis Y Wound N N Survival
13 General surgery 12/03/92 5 Osteomyelitis Y Wound N N Survival
14 Vascular surgery 12/07/92 6 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound N Y Survival
15 Vascular surgery 12/07/92 6 Aneurysm of aorta Y Wound Y N Survival
16 Vascular surgery 12/07/92 6 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y Y Survival
17 Surgical ICU 12/21/92 8 Colon surgery for obstruction Y Wound N N Death
18 Surgical ICU 03/01/93 18 Liver transplantation Y Wound N N Death
19 General surgery 03/03/93 18 Esophageal cancer Y Wound N N Survival
20 Vascular surgery 03/03/93 18 Aneurysm of aorta Y Wound Y N Survival
21 General surgery 03/06/93 18 Colon cancer Y Wound N N Survival
22 General surgery 03/10/93 19 Breast cancer Y Wound N N Survival
23 Vascular surgery 03/15/93 19 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y N Survival
24 General surgery 03/17/93 20 Colonic diverticulosis Y Wound N N Survival
25 Vascular surgery 03/22/93 20 Atherosclerotic vascular disease Y Wound Y Y Death
26 General surgery 03/30/93 22 Colon cancer Y Wound N N Survival
27 General surgery 03/31/93 22 Gastric cancer N N N Survival
a Y, yes; N, no.
b Defined as mortality 1 year after MRSA was first isolated. In patients 1, 2, and 18, mortality was directly related to infection with MRSA.
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mg/ml). Southern blots were prepared on Hybond N1 membranes (Amersham
International, Amersham, United Kingdom) by using a vacuum miniblot system
(Millipore Corp., Bedford, Mass.) and stored at 48C until use. For hybridization,
a probe based on the IS431 sequence, an insertion-like element which is found
frequently among staphylococci (2), was used. The probe, designed to amplify an
800-bp sequence from IS431, was produced by PCR using two primers: primer 1,
59-TACATCATGTTAATAAGGG-39; and primer 2, 59-TTGCGTGAGTGTG
GCGAAGC-39. The target for amplification was 5 ml of S. aureus suspension
which was also used for digestion as described above. Amplification was per-
formed as described previously (25) for 35 cycles of 1 min at 948C, 2 min at 558C,
and 2 min at 728C using a thermocycler (Perkin-Elmer). After amplification, the
PCR products were divided into aliquots of 10 ml and purified by agarose gel
electrophoresis using low-melting-temperature agarose (preparative grade; Bio-
Rad) (26). After the DNA fragments were separated, agarose blocks containing
DNA with the expected molecular weight were cut from the gel and directly used
for labelling or stored at 2208C until they were processed. Nonradioactive
labelling of probe DNA with horseradish peroxidase was performed directly in
the agarose blocks by using the enhanced chemiluminescence gene detection
system (Amersham International) according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
One agarose block containing labelled DNA was used for hybridization of one
blot. Southern blot hybridization was performed and recorded as described
previously (15).
RESULTS
Epidemiological surveillance. The first patient involved in
the MRSA outbreak was identified in the hematology unit,
where she was treated for acute myeloid leukemia. Because of
neutropenia (granulocyte count, ,500 3 109/liter), she was
nursed in a private room with laminar-airflow high-efficiency
particulate air filtration, as were all other neutropenic patients
on this unit. The patient was given oral ciprofloxacin prophy-
lactically, as was the unit’s routine. Subsequently, she devel-
oped sepsis with MRSA of which she died within 3 days,
despite immediate treatment with vancomycin. The surveil-
lance cultures, which were obtained twice weekly, were nega-
tive until the patient developed the bacteremia. Also, two sets
of surveillance cultures which were obtained for all other pa-
tients and the HCW and other contacts on the hematology unit
were all negative for MRSA. No environmental source was
identified.
Ten days after the first patient was identified, additional
patients who carried MRSA were identified on the surgical
unit, which was located far from the hematology unit. A nurse
on the surgical unit was colonized by an MRSA strain (strain 6;
Table 2) that was identical to the outbreak strain. This nurse
probably transmitted the outbreak strain of MRSA to the
surgical unit, as she had been transferred from the hematology
unit to surgery shortly after the first patient was identified.
After MRSA was detected on the surgical unit, surveillance
cultures were done repeatedly for all patients and HCW (nurs-
es, physicians, and paramedical employees) on this unit. A
total of 26 patients and 13 HCW (including the nurse who
came from the hematology unit) carried MRSA. Of the 26
surgical patients colonized with MRSA, 20 (77%) developed a
clinically proven MRSA infection. Four of these individuals
died (25%); two of these deaths were directly related to the
MRSA infection. The clinical diagnoses and geographical and
bacteriological data for the 27 MRSA-positive patients are
detailed in Table 1.
Figure 1 shows the incidence of MRSA-positive patients
during the outbreak period. The first episode of the outbreak
involved primarily patients who had had vascular surgery who
had necrotic wounds or had prosthetic vascular grafts that had
been implanted recently. Most of these patients developed
clinically significant wound infections.
To control this outbreak, the vascular surgery ward was
closed and the patients who were colonized with MRSA were
transferred to an MRSA cohort isolation facility which was
created outside the hospital in week 10 after the outbreak
began. A separate team of nurses and doctors took care of
these patients. The surgical ward, including the floors, walls,
ceilings, and furniture, was cleaned completely and disinfected
with 4-chlor-2-benzylphenol (2% [wt/vol]) and ortho-phenyl-
phenol (2% [wt/vol]). HCW who were colonized with MRSA
were treated with nasal mupirocin ointment (Bactroban;
SmithKline Beecham) and sent home until MRSA carriage
was eradicated. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the first episode was
rapidly controlled. In week 13, only a single patient remained
in the isolation facility. It was then decided to close this facility
and treat the last patient in a regular hospital department, in
strict isolation (private room with negative air pressure and
gloves, gowns, and masks required for everyone who entered
the room, and the patient confined to his room as much as
possible). Despite strict isolation, this particular patient served
as a source for the second episode of the outbreak. This epi-
sode involved fewer patients and HCW but more surgical
wards. Most patients probably acquired MRSA in the surgical
intensive care unit (ICU), where they were treated for a few
days postoperation. However, MRSA carriage was not de-
tected until after the patients were transferred to other surgical
wards. The second episode of the outbreak was controlled by
intensifying bacteriological surveillance of patients and HCW
and by reinstituting the isolation facility.
Twenty-two weeks after the outbreak began, routine bacte-
rial cultures of food prepared for neutropenic patients in the
hematology unit revealed MRSA in a piece of banana, which
had been peeled by a dietary worker who worked in this unit.
Therefore, all personnel who prepared food for patients on the
hematology unit were screened for MRSA carriage. MRSA
was cultured repeatedly from throat swabs but not from the
nares or the perirectal area of the dietary worker. This HCW
was working on the hematology unit at the time the first patient
was detected but never contacted directly patients or HCW
with MRSA. The MRSA strains cultured from the hematology
patient, the piece of banana, and the dietary worker were
identical (Table 2, strains 1a/b, 2, and 3, respectively). The
dietary worker was treated successfully by application of mupi-
rocin nasal ointment twice a day and daily washing of body and
hair with disinfecting soap for 5 consecutive days.
Antibiotic sensitivity of MRSA. All outbreak strains that
were evaluated had similar antibiograms (Table 2). Except for
isolate 17, all outbreak strains (1 through 17) were resistant to
methicillin. Also, all isolates were resistant to tobramycin,
erythromycin, ciprofloxacin, rifampin, clindamycin, and tetra-
cycline. All were susceptible to vancomycin and co-trimox-
azole. More variability was found regarding susceptibility to
phosphomycin and fusidic acid. Isolate 17 was sensitive to
methicillin as determined by the disk diffusion assay. This iso-
late was obtained from a patient who also carried methicillin-
resistant isolates. The antibiograms of the isolates in control
group 1 (Table 2, isolates 18 to 22) were more heterogeneous.
The antibiograms of the isolates in control group 2 (Table 2,
isolates 23 to 30) were generally similar to the outbreak strains.
Phage typing. All outbreak-related isolates, including the
methicillin-susceptible isolate 17, were phage type III29. None
of the isolates in control group 2 were of this phage type.
AP-PCR and PFGE. AP-PCR, based on a combination of
several primer-dependent genocodes, revealed genetic homo-
geneity in the group of outbreak-related isolates, all of which
were type A (Table 2 and Fig. 2). Three subtypes (A1 to A3)
were identified within the outbreak-related isolates. As deter-
mined by PFGE analysis, all strains but one (isolate 17) were
type A, although subclonal variation was observed (Table 2
and Fig. 3). All strains identified as PFGE type A had a sim-
ilarity index of more than 90%, as determined by UPGMA
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analysis. Strain 17 was discriminated from the other outbreak-
related isolates (similarity index of approximately 80%). Both
AP-PCR and PFGE distinguished all control group 1 isolates
from the outbreak-related isolates. Also, there was full agree-
ment between PFGE and AP-PCR within this group of strains.
Both AP-PCR and PFGE detected genetic heterogeneity
among control group 2 strains. AP-PCR discriminated four
types and PFGE detected three types, when subclonal varia-
tion is disregarded. However, some results of AP-PCR and
PFGE typing were discordant. For instance, AP-PCR did not
discriminate among isolates 23 and 27 to 30, whereas PFGE
identified three different types (A, B, and G) within this group.
On the other hand, PFGE did not discriminate among isolates
24 to 27 and 29 (PFGE type A), but AP-PCR identified four
different types (E through H).
AP-PCR discriminated eight types and PFGE discriminated
seven types in the total group of 30 strains. The combined
results of AP-PCR and PFGE differentiated 11 types.
PCR-mediated protein A typing. Protein A gene typing re-
vealed 11 repeats in all outbreak-related isolates (Table 2 and
Fig. 4). In contrast, only seven or nine repeats were identified
in isolates from control group 1. Four of eight isolates from
control group 2 also contained 11 repeats.
IS431 probing. Table 2 shows the results of IS431 typing. All
outbreak-related isolates and three of eight isolates from con-
trol group 2 were IS431 type 1, whereas none of the isolates in
control group 1 were of this type.
Combination of genotypic methods. Together, the genotyp-
ing methods (AP-PCR, PFGE, protein A, and IS431) discrim-
inated 13 different types among all isolates tested. All outbreak
strains but one (the methicillin-susceptible isolate 17) were
similar when subclonal variation was disregarded. Eleven dif-
TABLE 2. Comparison of results from phenotypic and genotypic typing methods
Group and isolation
date (mo/yr)
Site or
sourcea Ward
Isolate
no.b
Antibiotic
susceptibilityc
Phage
type
Protein
A typed
IS431
type
Type determined
by PCR primer
speciese:
AP-PCR
typef
PFGE
typef
Combined
PFGE–AP-
PCR typeg
Combined
PFGE–AP-
PCR-protein
A-IS431
typegA B C D E
Outbreak group
11/92 Blood Hematology 1a/b 20020002020 III29 11 1 19 1 19 1 1 A3 A1/A1 19 19
03/93 Banana Hematology 2 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
03/93 HCW Hematology 3 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
11/92 ASP Vascular surgery 4 00020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
11/92 Nose Vascular surgery 5a/b 00020002000 III29 11 1 19 1 19 1 1 A3 A1/A1 19 19
11/92 HCW Vascular surgery 6 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
11/92 HCW Vascular surgery 7 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
03/93 Wound Vascular surgery 8 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
12/92 HCW Surgical ICU 9 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
12/92 Wound Surgical ICU 10 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A3 10 10
12/92 Wound Surgical ICU 11 00020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
01/93 IVC Surgical ICU 12 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
01/93 Nose Surgical ICU 13 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
03/93 Bile Surgical ICU 14 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
12/92 Blood General surgery 15 00020002000 III29 11 1 19 1 19 1 1 A3 A1 19 19
01/93 Wound General surgery 16 20020002020 III29 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 A1 A2 1 1
04/93 Wound General surgery 17 02020002020 III29 11 1 1 19 1 1 1 A2 C 2 2
Control group 1
08/92 Nose Surgery 18 20020002020 III95 9 3 19 2 1 1 2 B D 3 3
12/92 Urine Plastic surgery 19 10022022220 E1 7 2 2 3 2 1 3 C E1 4 4
05/93 Wound Dermatology 20 20002022200 Z74 9 2 19 4 3 1 1 D F 5 5
11/86 Sputum Cardiac surgery 21a/b 20022022220 E1 7 5 2 3 2 1 3 C E1/E2 4/49 6/69
12/86 Feces Internal medicine 22 20022002220 E1 7 5 2 3 2 1 3 C E2 49 6
Control group 2h
05/92 NA 23 20020002220 III29 10 1 3 1 19 1 1 E B2 6 7
01/92 NA 24 20020002021 III29 11 1 4 1 4 1 1 F A1 7 8
02/91 NA 25 20020002020 III29 6 6 5 5 5 1 4 G A1 8 9
04/91 NA 26 20020002020 III29 10 6 6 6 6 2 5 H A1 9 10
06/91 NA 27 20020002020 III29 NDi 6 3 1 19 1 1 E A1 10 11
06/91 NA 28 20020002220 III29 11 1 3 19 19 1 1 E9 G 11 12
08/91 NA 29 20020002020 III29 11 ND 3 1 19 1 1 E A4 10 11
11/91 NA 30 20020002220 III29 11 4 3 1 19 1 1 E B1 6 13
a ASP, air-settling plate; IVC, intravascular catheter; NA, not available.
b a/b, strain typed in duplicate by PFGE.
c The values shown are for, from left to right, phosphomycin, oxacillin, tobramycin, co-trimoxazole, ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, clindamycin, vancomycin, rifampin,
fusidic acid, and tetracycline. In the antibiogram, 0 indicates resistance, 2 indicates susceptibility, and 1 indicates intermediate susceptibility.
d Number of repetitive units present in the protein A gene.
e A, primer 186; B, primer 188; C, primer 192; D, primer ERIC1; E, primer ERIC2. Primes indicate one- or two-band differences.
f Subnumbering indicates subclonal relationships. Prime indicates one- or two-band differences.
g Primes indicate subclonal variation.
h Control group 2 strains were derived from a collection of MRSA strains from various Dutch hospitals in the Dutch National Institute of Public Health and
Environmental Protection.
i ND, not determined.
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ferent strains were identified among the 13 isolates from con-
trol groups 1 and 2. The two control group 1 strains that could
not be distinguished from each other (21 and 22) were isolated
from patients who, within a 3-week period, were transferred to
our hospital from the same foreign hospital.
DISCUSSION
Despite the low incidence (,5%) of MRSA in Dutch hos-
pitals, this organism regularly causes outbreaks (33). In order
to prevent outbreaks and decrease the endemic incidence of
MRSA, we need to define the mechanisms by which this mul-
tiresistant microorganism is transmitted. Numerous investiga-
tors have used traditional epidemiological and molecular typ-
ing methods to identify risk factors for acquisition of MRSA,
the reservoirs occupied by MRSA, and the means by which it
is transmitted, yet we have much to learn about the epidemi-
ology of this important pathogen.
We used several pheno- and genotyping methods to inves-
tigate an unusual explosive outbreak of MRSA in the Univer-
FIG. 1. Incidence of MRSA in patients (Pat.), HCW, and food during the outbreak in the hematology, vascular surgery (vasc. surg.), and general surgery (gen. surg.)
units and the surgical ICU (surg. ICU). The number of new cases per week (bars) is shown. The three strains isolated from the dietary worker, from food, and from
the patient in the hematology unit (arrows) are indicated. Patients are indicated by solid bars, HCW by open bars, and food by hatched bars.
FIG. 2. Representative examples of the results of PCR-mediated DNA fin-
gerprinting using primer ERIC2. Isolate numbers (in accordance with Table 2)
are indicated above the lanes, and molecular weight markers (m) (lambda DNA
cut with HindIII) are indicated on the right (in base pairs).
FIG. 3. PFGE-mediated DNA typing of MRSA strains. DNA was digested
with restriction enzyme SmaI. Lanes S, concatemeric forms of lambda DNA,
differing in size from 48.5 to 485 kb, as indicated on the left; lanes 1 to 12, DNA
from the following strains and PFGE types: strain 4, type A2 (lane 1); strain 17,
type C (lane 2); strain 10, type A3 (lane 3); strain 5a, type A1 (lane 4); strain 23,
type B2 (lane 5); strain 29, type A4 (lane 6); strain 18, type D (lane 7); strain 19,
type E1 (lane 8); strain 21, type E2 (lane 9); strain 20, type F (lane 10); strain 28,
type G (lane 11); and strain 30, type B1 (lane 12).
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sity Hospital Rotterdam. The likely source of this outbreak was
a dietary worker who prepared food for patients on the hema-
tology unit. We identified this individual, who had no direct
contact with patients, because we found the epidemic strain in
a routine surveillance culture of a banana which the dietary
worker had peeled. A subsequent culture of the dietary work-
er’s nares revealed that he carried the epidemic strain. In
contrast, the index patient’s surveillance cultures were negative
for 3 weeks before she developed MRSA sepsis. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first time investigators have implicated con-
taminated food in the transmission of MRSA. In general, in-
gestion of MRSA should not lead to subsequent infection
because gastric acid and the normal gastrointestinal flora
should prevent this organism from colonizing the gastrointes-
tinal tract. Moreover, the immune system usually eliminates
transient invading microorganisms. The index patient, how-
ever, was severely immunocompromised, and she had taken
both antacids, which would neutralize the gastric acid, and oral
ciprofloxacin, which may have selected the ciprofloxacin-resis-
tant outbreak strain. We postulate that the index patient in-
gested food contaminated by the outbreak strain, which then
colonized the patient’s gastrointestinal tract. Subsequently,
while the patient was neutropenic, the outbreak strain trans-
located through the gastrointestinal mucosa into the blood-
stream, causing the patient’s fatal infection.
A nurse who initially worked on the hematology unit prob-
ably transmitted the outbreak strain between wards when she
was transferred to the vascular surgery unit. In the latter unit,
the outbreak strain caused an explosive MRSA epidemic. By
using stringent infection control measures, we terminated the
outbreak within 6 months, and we eliminated the outbreak
strain from our hospital. Although many infection control ex-
perts consider instituting an isolation facility outside the hos-
pital an extreme measure, we feel that in this particular out-
break it was better than other systems of isolation. First,
because the outbreak strain was airborne and hence contami-
nated the environment extensively, we think the isolation unit
enabled us to control this outbreak more quickly than we could
have if the patients had been cared for within the hospital.
Second, because all patients in the isolation facility had
MRSA, the patients were not kept in strict isolation. The
patients were able to move about the ward as they desired,
which may have enhanced their recovery. It should be remem-
bered that in The Netherlands there is a national guideline for
the control of MRSA, aimed at total elimination of MRSA and
not confinement to a low endemic level.
The ratio of MRSA-infected to MRSA-colonized patients in
this outbreak (78%) was much higher than that observed in
previous outbreaks (up to 40%) (20). The increased frequency
of infection and the high mortality rate (5 of 27; 18.5%) may
have been related in part to the severity and nature of the
patients’ underlying diseases. The index patient was severely
immunocompromised, and the patients on the vascular surgery
unit had large, poorly healing wounds and many had prosthetic
vascular grafts. In addition, we think the outbreak strain might
have been more virulent than other MRSA strains. For methi-
cillin-susceptible S. aureus, it has been shown that there are
differences in virulence between strains (36). Because protein
A modulates opsonization and chemotaxis (35), the outbreak
strain, which had more copies of the protein A gene than did
many control isolates, might have evaded host defenses more
readily than other strains.
We routinely evaluate the ability of all patients with MRSA
to disperse the organism into the air and hence to contaminate
the environment. Of the 20 patients with MRSA who were
transferred to our hospital from foreign hospitals before the
outbreak, none dispersed MRSA to the extent that we ob-
served in this epidemic. Air-settling plates for 16 of those 20
patients were negative and for 4 patients contained ,5 CFU
per plate. In contrast, air-settling plates in the rooms of several
patients from this outbreak contained .100 CFU. Further-
more, despite the patients being kept in strict isolation, air-
settling plates in the corridors outside patients’ rooms were
also positive for the outbreak strain. We think that the positive
air pressure in the patients’ rooms carried MRSA from the
contaminated rooms into the hallway. Although staff who car-
ried the outbreak strain may have contaminated the settling
plates in the corridors, we do not think that this was the likely
mechanism. We made cultures from specimens from the staff
twice weekly to identify those who acquired MRSA, and we
tested all positive staff members (16) to determine whether
they dispersed the organism. We did not identify any staff
members who dispersed MRSA during their tests.
Particular characteristics of the affected patients and the
outbreak strain may have facilitated the profuse environmental
contamination noted in this outbreak. Boyce et al. previously
reported that patients who had MRSA in a wound or in their
urine contaminated the environment more frequently than did
patients with MRSA in the nares or sputum (34 versus 2% of
the surfaces cultured were positive, respectively) (6). There-
fore, our patients who had large, poorly healing wounds may
have been more likely to disperse MRSA.
Other investigators have observed differences in the trans-
missibility of S. aureus strains (8, 10). Recently, Frenay et al.
proposed that the number of repetitive elements in the spacer
region of the staphylococcal protein A gene correlated with the
ability of MRSA strains to cause outbreaks (12). They argued
that higher numbers of repeats enhanced the accessibility of
the immunogloblin G binding region of protein A and thereby
contributed to epidemic spread of the organism. Our outbreak
strain had 11 copies of the protein A gene, which is within the
epidemic range (more than 7 copies) defined by Frenay et al.
(12).
In summary, we hypothesize that patients who had wounds
that were colonized or infected with the outbreak strain dis-
persed MRSA into the air. The airborne organisms subse-
quently contaminated many surfaces in the patients’ rooms and
corridors. HCW who touched these contaminated surfaces and
who did not subsequently wash their hands transmitted the
epidemic strain to other patients. As in the study of Boyce et al.
(6), HCW may also have contaminated their clothing and
transmitted the outbreak strain in this manner.
Because the incidence of MRSA in The Netherlands is ex-
tremely low, isolates obtained during outbreaks are likely to be
FIG. 4. Typing of protein A gene polymorphisms by PCR and RsaI RFLP
analysis. Shown are representative examples of all types that were encountered
during the analysis. Isolate numbers are displayed above the lanes. Lane m,
molecular weight markers (Pharmacia 100-bp ladder). On the right, the lengths
of some of the markers are indicated (in base pairs). Below the lanes, the length
of the variable fragment is indicated (in numbers of repeat units).
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clonally related. Therefore, we evaluated isolates from our
outbreak by several molecular typing methods, and we com-
pared the results of the different methods. AP-PCR and PFGE
most clearly discriminated outbreak-associated isolates from
control isolates. In our study, PFGE identified more subclones
than did PCR. Saulnier et al. noted similar results (27), but
further analysis determined that the discriminatory abilities of
PFGE and PCR depended, respectively, on the number of
restriction enzymes and the number of primers used (31).
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Table 2, some PCR primers
detected more variability than did others; four primers identi-
fied five or more types, whereas primer ERIC1 identified only
two types. To date, no one has determined which primers and
how many primers should be used to evaluate MRSA isolates.
At present, we do not know why MRSA isolates obtained
during the course of an outbreak had minor genomic differ-
ences. However, Van Belkum et al. noted similar variability
among Legionella pneumophila isolates (32). Perhaps this vari-
ability reflects the intrinsic genetic flexibility of the microbes or
their ability to adapt to a host.
Both PFGE and PCR were more discriminatory than pro-
tein A typing or IS431 typing. We identified the most strain
variability when we combined the results of these four geno-
typing methods. Using the combined results, we considered all
but one of the outbreak-related isolates (isolate 17) to be the
same strain. We did not identify the outbreak strain among the
control isolates.
Only PFGE and methicillin susceptibility discriminated iso-
late 17 from the other outbreak isolates. Isolate 17 possessed
the mecA gene (documented by PCR) but did not express
methicillin resistance. At present, we do not know the mech-
anism by which this isolate remains susceptible to methicillin.
None of the typing methods distinguished between two iso-
lates in control group 1 (isolates 21 and 22). We subsequently
learned that these isolates were obtained from two patients
who, within a short period, were transferred to our hospital
from the same foreign hospital. Hence, the patients may have
acquired the same strain while they were in the other hospital.
In summary, our MRSA outbreak displayed several unusual
features, including transmission of the outbreak strain by food
and by air and a very high infection-to-colonization ratio. We
think the patients’ wounds and particular characteristics of the
outbreak MRSA strain allowed that strain to spread explo-
sively on our vascular surgery unit. Furthermore, we think the
isolation unit helped us terminate the outbreak expeditiously.
Finally, PFGE and AP-PCR discriminated the outbreak-re-
lated isolates from control isolates, and protein A typing sug-
gested that the outbreak strain might be more transmissible
and virulent than other MRSA isolates.
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